use appropriate crypto context for encryption and decryption

ensures that the correct ROC is used
pull/114/head
Richard Fuchs 11 years ago
parent 0ac1ed2419
commit 9c3ad508f7

@ -2071,26 +2071,28 @@ static int srtp_auth_validate(struct re_crypto_context *c,
if (srtp_hash(hmac, c, s, r, pkt_idx)) if (srtp_hash(hmac, c, s, r, pkt_idx))
return -1; return -1;
if (!memcmp(auth_tag, hmac, s->auth_tag_len)) if (!memcmp(auth_tag, hmac, s->auth_tag_len))
goto ok; goto ok_update;
/* or maybe we did a rollover too many */ /* or maybe we did a rollover too many */
if (pkt_idx >= 0x20000) { if (pkt_idx >= 0x20000) {
pkt_idx -= 0x20000; pkt_idx -= 0x20000;
if (srtp_hash(hmac, c, s, r, pkt_idx)) if (srtp_hash(hmac, c, s, r, pkt_idx))
return -1; return -1;
if (!memcmp(auth_tag, hmac, s->auth_tag_len)) if (!memcmp(auth_tag, hmac, s->auth_tag_len))
goto ok; goto ok_update;
} }
/* last guess: reset ROC to zero */ /* last guess: reset ROC to zero */
pkt_idx &= 0xffff; pkt_idx &= 0xffff;
if (srtp_hash(hmac, c, s, r, pkt_idx)) if (srtp_hash(hmac, c, s, r, pkt_idx))
return -1; return -1;
if (!memcmp(auth_tag, hmac, s->auth_tag_len)) if (!memcmp(auth_tag, hmac, s->auth_tag_len))
goto ok; goto ok_update;
return -1; return -1;
ok: ok_update:
*pkt_idx_p = pkt_idx; *pkt_idx_p = pkt_idx;
update_packet_index(c, s, pkt_idx);
ok:
return 0; return 0;
} }
@ -2203,7 +2205,7 @@ static unsigned int rtpengine46(struct sk_buff *skb, struct rtpengine_table *t,
unsigned int datalen; unsigned int datalen;
u_int32_t *u32; u_int32_t *u32;
struct rtp_parsed rtp; struct rtp_parsed rtp;
u_int64_t pkt_idx = 0, pkt_idx_u; u_int64_t pkt_idx;
skb_reset_transport_header(skb); skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
uh = udp_hdr(skb); uh = udp_hdr(skb);
@ -2275,22 +2277,13 @@ src_check_ok:
rtp_pt_idx = rtp_payload_type(rtp.header, &g->target); rtp_pt_idx = rtp_payload_type(rtp.header, &g->target);
if ((&g->decrypt)->cipher->decrypt) { // Pass to userspace if SSRC has changed.
pkt_idx_u = pkt_idx = packet_index(&g->decrypt, &g->target.decrypt, rtp.header); if ((g->encrypt.ssrc) && (g->encrypt.ssrc != rtp.header->ssrc))
if (srtp_auth_validate(&g->decrypt, &g->target.decrypt, &rtp, &pkt_idx)) goto skip_error;
goto skip_error;
if (pkt_idx != pkt_idx_u)
update_packet_index(&g->decrypt, &g->target.decrypt, pkt_idx);
} else {
// Pass to userspace if SSRC has changed.
if ((g->encrypt.ssrc) && (g->encrypt.ssrc != rtp.header->ssrc))
goto skip_error;
pkt_idx_u = pkt_idx = packet_index(&g->encrypt, &g->target.encrypt, rtp.header);
if (pkt_idx != pkt_idx_u)
update_packet_index(&g->encrypt, &g->target.encrypt, pkt_idx);
}
pkt_idx = packet_index(&g->decrypt, &g->target.decrypt, rtp.header);
if (srtp_auth_validate(&g->decrypt, &g->target.decrypt, &rtp, &pkt_idx))
goto skip_error;
if (srtp_decrypt(&g->decrypt, &g->target.decrypt, &rtp, pkt_idx)) if (srtp_decrypt(&g->decrypt, &g->target.decrypt, &rtp, pkt_idx))
goto skip_error; goto skip_error;
@ -2313,6 +2306,7 @@ not_rtp:
} }
if (rtp.ok) { if (rtp.ok) {
pkt_idx = packet_index(&g->encrypt, &g->target.encrypt, rtp.header);
srtp_encrypt(&g->encrypt, &g->target.encrypt, &rtp, pkt_idx); srtp_encrypt(&g->encrypt, &g->target.encrypt, &rtp, pkt_idx);
skb_put(skb, g->target.encrypt.mki_len + g->target.encrypt.auth_tag_len); skb_put(skb, g->target.encrypt.mki_len + g->target.encrypt.auth_tag_len);
srtp_authenticate(&g->encrypt, &g->target.encrypt, &rtp, pkt_idx); srtp_authenticate(&g->encrypt, &g->target.encrypt, &rtp, pkt_idx);

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