manager: prevent file access outside of config dir

Add live_dangerously flag to manager and use this flag to
determine if a configuation file outside of AST_CONFIG_DIR
should be read.

ASTERISK-30176

Change-Id: I46b26af4047433b49ae5c8a85cb8cda806a07404
(cherry picked from commit 81f10e847e)

configs/samples/asterisk.conf.sample

@@ -95,10 +95,13 @@ documentation_language = en_US	; Set the language you want documentation
 				;         documented in extensions.conf.sample.
 				; Default gosub.
 ;live_dangerously = no		; Enable the execution of 'dangerous' dialplan
-				; functions from external sources (AMI,
+				; functions and configuration file access from
-				; etc.) These functions (such as SHELL) are
+				; external sources (AMI, etc.) These functions
-				; considered dangerous because they can allow
+				; (such as SHELL) are considered dangerous
-				; privilege escalation.
+				; because they can allow privilege escalation.
+				; Configuration files are considered dangerous
+				; if they exist outside of the Asterisk
+				; configuration directory.
 				; Default no
 ;entityid=00:11:22:33:44:55	; Entity ID.
 				; This is in the form of a MAC address.

doc/UPGRADE-staging/manager_config_live_dangerously.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+Subject: AMI (Asterisk Manager Interface)
+
+Previously, GetConfig and UpdateConfig were able to access files outside of
+the Asterisk configuration directory. Now this access is put behind the
+live_dangerously configuration option in asterisk.conf, which is disabled by
+default. If access to configuration files outside of the Asterisk configuation
+directory is required via AMI, then the live_dangerously configuration option
+must be set to yes.

include/asterisk/manager.h

@@ -350,6 +350,18 @@ void astman_send_list_complete_start(struct mansession *s, const struct message
  */
 void astman_send_list_complete_end(struct mansession *s);
 
+/*!
+ * \brief Enable/disable the inclusion of 'dangerous' configurations outside
+ * of the ast_config_AST_CONFIG_DIR
+ *
+ * This function can globally enable/disable the loading of configuration files
+ * outside of ast_config_AST_CONFIG_DIR.
+ *
+ * \param new_live_dangerously If true, enable the access of files outside
+ * ast_config_AST_CONFIG_DIR from astman.
+ */
+void astman_live_dangerously(int new_live_dangerously);
+
 void __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))) astman_append(struct mansession *s, const char *fmt, ...);
 
 /*! \brief Determine if a manager session ident is authenticated */

main/manager.c

@@ -1491,6 +1491,11 @@ static struct stasis_forward *rtp_topic_forwarder;
 /*! \brief The \ref stasis_subscription for forwarding the Security topic to the AMI topic */
 static struct stasis_forward *security_topic_forwarder;
 
+/*!
+ * \brief Set to true (non-zero) to globally allow all dangerous AMI actions to run
+ */
+static int live_dangerously;
+
 #ifdef TEST_FRAMEWORK
 /*! \brief The \ref stasis_subscription for forwarding the Test topic to the AMI topic */
 static struct stasis_forward *test_suite_forwarder;
@@ -3610,6 +3615,29 @@ static int action_ping(struct mansession *s, const struct message *m)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void astman_live_dangerously(int new_live_dangerously)
+{
+	if (new_live_dangerously && !live_dangerously)
+	{
+		ast_log(LOG_WARNING, "Manager Configuration load protection disabled.\n");
+	}
+
+	if (!new_live_dangerously && live_dangerously)
+	{
+		ast_log(LOG_NOTICE, "Manager Configuration load protection enabled.\n");
+	}
+	live_dangerously = new_live_dangerously;
+}
+
+static int restrictedFile(const char *filename)
+{
+	if (!live_dangerously && !strncasecmp(filename, "/", 1) &&
+		 strncasecmp(filename, ast_config_AST_CONFIG_DIR, strlen(ast_config_AST_CONFIG_DIR))) {
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int action_getconfig(struct mansession *s, const struct message *m)
 {
 	struct ast_config *cfg;
@@ -3628,6 +3656,11 @@ static int action_getconfig(struct mansession *s, const struct message *m)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (restrictedFile(fn)) {
+		astman_send_error(s, m, "File requires escalated priveledges");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	cfg = ast_config_load2(fn, "manager", config_flags);
 	if (cfg == CONFIG_STATUS_FILEMISSING) {
 		astman_send_error(s, m, "Config file not found");
@@ -3755,6 +3788,11 @@ static int action_getconfigjson(struct mansession *s, const struct message *m)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (restrictedFile(fn)) {
+		astman_send_error(s, m, "File requires escalated priveledges");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (!(cfg = ast_config_load2(fn, "manager", config_flags))) {
 		astman_send_error(s, m, "Config file not found");
 		return 0;
@@ -4106,6 +4144,10 @@ static int action_updateconfig(struct mansession *s, const struct message *m)
 		astman_send_error(s, m, "Filename not specified");
 		return 0;
 	}
+	if (restrictedFile(sfn) || restrictedFile(dfn)) {
+		astman_send_error(s, m, "File requires escalated priveledges");
+		return 0;
+	}
 	if (!(cfg = ast_config_load2(sfn, "manager", config_flags))) {
 		astman_send_error(s, m, "Config file not found");
 		return 0;

main/options.c

@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ void load_asterisk_conf(void)
 	}
 	if (!ast_opt_remote) {
 		pbx_live_dangerously(live_dangerously);
+		astman_live_dangerously(live_dangerously);
 	}
 
 	option_debug += option_debug_new;