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<section id="auth.parameters" xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">

    <title>Parameters</title>
    
    <section id="auth.p.auth_checks_register">
	<title><varname>auth_checks_register</varname> (flags)</title>
	<para>
		See description of parameter <varname>auth_checks_in_dlg</varname>.
	</para>
	</section>

    <section id="auth.p.auth_checks_no_dlg">
	<title><varname>auth_checks_no_dlg</varname> (flags)</title>
	<para>
		See description of parameter <varname>auth_checks_in_dlg</varname>.
	</para>
	</section>

    <section id="auth.p.auth_checks_in_dlg">
		<title><varname>auth_checks_in_dlg</varname> (flags)</title>
	<para>
		These three module parameters control which optional integrity
        	checks will be performed on the SIP message carrying digest response
        	during SIP MD5 digest authentication. <varname>auth_check_register</varname>
        	controls integrity checks to be performed on REGISTER messages,
        	<varname>auth_checks_no_dlg</varname> controls which optional
        	integrity checks will be performed on SIP requests that have no To
        	header field or no To tag (in other words the requests either
        	establishing or outside dialogs).
		<varname>auth_checks_in_dlg</varname> controls which
        	integrity checks will be performed on SIP requests within dialogs,
        	such as BYE or re-INVITE. The default value for all three parameters
        	is 0 (old behaviour, no extra checks). The set of integrity checks
        	that can be performed on REGISTERs is typically different from sets of
        	integrity checks that can be performed for other SIP request types,
        	hence we have three independent module parameters.
	</para>
	<para>
		Without the extra checks the nonce will protect only against expired
		values. Some reply attacks are still possible in the expire "window".
		A possible workaround is to always force qop authentication and 
		always check the uri from the authorization header, but this would
		not work if an upstream proxy rewrites the uri
		and it will also not work with a lot of UA implementations.
	</para>
	<para>
		In this case the nonce value will be used only to hold
		the expire time (see <varname>nonce_expire</varname>) and an MD5
		over it and some secret (the MD5 is used to make sure that nobody
		tampers with the nonce expire time).
	</para>
	<para>
		When the extra checks are enabled, the nonce will include an extra
		MD5 over the selected part/parts of the message (see below) and some 
		other secret. This will be used to check if the selected part of 
		the message is the same when an UA tries to reuse the nonce, thus 
		protecting or severely limiting reply attacks.
	</para>
	<para>
		The possible flag values for all three parameters are:
		<itemizedlist>
			<listitem><para>
				<emphasis>1</emphasis> for checking if the message
				URI changed (uses the whole URI)
			</para></listitem>
			<listitem><para>
				<emphasis>2</emphasis> for checking the callid
			</para></listitem>
			<listitem><para>
				<emphasis>4</emphasis> for checking the From tag
			</para></listitem>
			<listitem><para>
				<emphasis>8</emphasis> for checking the source IP address
				(see nonce.h).
			</para></listitem>
		</itemizedlist>
	</para>
	<para>
		As an example setting <varname>auth_checks_register</varname> to 3
		would check if the callid or the request uri changed from the REGISTER
		message for which the original nonce was generated (this would allow nonce reuse only
		within the same UA and for the expire time).  Note that enabling
		the extra checks will limit nonce caching by UAs, requiring extra
		challenges and roundtrips, but will provide much better protection.
	</para>
	<warning><para>
		Do not enable the from tag check (4) for REGISTERs
		(<varname>auth_checks_register</varname>) and out-of-dialog messages
		(<varname>auth_checks_no_dlg</varname>) unless you are sure that all
		your user agents do not change the from tag when challenged. Some
		user agents will also change the callid when the challenged request
		is not in-dialog, so avoid enabling the callid check (2) for
		messages that are not part of a dialog
		(<varname>auth_checks_no_dlg</varname>).
		In some rare case this will also have to be done for REGISTERs.
	</para></warning>
	<para>
		When the <varname>secret</varname> parameter is set and the extra
		checks are enabled, the first half of the <varname>secret</varname> 
		will be used for the expire time MD5 and the other half for the extra
		checks MD5, so make sure you have a long secret (32 chars or longer are
		recommended).
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>Setting the <varname>auth_checks_register</varname> module 
				parameter</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
# For REGISTER requests we hash the Request-URI, Call-ID, and source IP of the
# request into the nonce string. This ensures that the generated credentials
# cannot be used with another registrar, user agent with another source IP
# address or Call-ID. Note that user agents that change Call-ID with every
# REGISTER message will not be able to register if you enable this.
modparam("auth", "auth_checks_register", 11)

# For dialog-establishing requests (such as the original INVITE, OPTIONS, etc)
# we hash the Request-URI and source IP. Hashing Call-ID and From tags takes
# some extra precaution, because these checks could render some UA unusable.
modparam("auth", "auth_checks_no_dlg", 9)

# For mid-dialog requests, such as re-INVITE, we can hash source IP and
# Request-URI just like in the previous case. In addition to that we can hash
# Call-ID and From tag because these are fixed within a dialog and are
# guaranteed not to change. This settings effectively restrict the usage of
# generated credentials to a single user agent within a single dialog.
modparam("auth", "auth_checks_in_dlg", 15)

...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
    </section>

    <section id="auth.p.qop">
	<title><varname>qop</varname> (string)</title>
	<para>
		If set, enable <emphasis>qop</emphasis> for challenges: each challenge
		will include a <emphasis>qop</emphasis> parameter. This is the 
		recommended way, but some older non rfc3261 compliant UAs might get
		confused and might not authenticate properly if <varname>qop</varname>
		is enabled.
	</para>
	<para>
		Enabling <varname>qop</varname> together with
		<varname>nonce_count</varname> will provide extra-security 
		(protection against replay attacks) while still allowing 
		credentials caching at the UA side and thus not compromising 
		performance.
	</para>
	<para>
		The possible values are: "auth", "auth-int" and "" (unset).
	</para>
	<para>
		The default value is not-set ("").
	</para>
	<para>
		See also:
			<varname>nonce_count</varname>.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>qop example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "qop", "auth")   # set qop=auth
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
    </section>

    <section id="auth.p.nonce_count">
	<title><varname>nonce_count</varname> (boolean)</title>
	<para>
		If enabled the received <emphasis>nc</emphasis> value is remembered 
		and checked against the older value (for a successful authentication
		the received <emphasis>nc</emphasis> must be greater then the 
		previously received one, see rfc2617 for more details). This will 
		provide protection against replay attacks while still allowing
		credentials caching at the UA side.
	</para>
	<para>
		It depends on <varname>qop</varname> being enabled (if 
		<varname>qop</varname> is not enabled, the challenges won't include
		<emphasis>qop</emphasis> and so the UA will probably not include the
		<emphasis>qop</emphasis> or <emphasis>nc</emphasis> parameters in its
		response).
	</para>
	<para>
		If a response doesn't include <emphasis>qop</emphasis> or 
		<emphasis>nc</emphasis> (for example obsolete UAs that don't support
		them) the response will be checked according to the other enabled
		nonce checks, in this order: one_time_nonce and auth_check_*.
		If a response includes <emphasis>nc</emphasis> only the normal
		<varname>nonce_expire</varname> checks and the 
		<varname>nonce_count</varname> checks will be performed, all
		the other checks will be ignored.
	</para>
	<para>
		The <varname>nonce_count</varname> checks work by tracking a limited
		number of nonces. The maximum number of tracked nonces is set using
		the <varname>nc_array_size</varname> or 
		<varname>nc_array_order</varname> parameters. If this number is 
		exceeded, older entries will be overwritten. As long as the maximum
		rate of challengeable messages per average response time is lower then
		<varname>nc_array_size</varname>, the <varname>nonce_count</varname>
		checks should work flawlessly. For optimum performance (maximum reuse
		of cache credentials) <varname>nc_array_size</varname> divided by
		<varname>nid_pool_no</varname> should be lower then the message rate
		 multiplied by the desired <varname>nonce_expire</varname>.
	</para>
	<para>
		The maximum accepted <emphasis>nc</emphasis> value is 255. If 
		<emphasis>nc</emphasis> becomes greater then this, the nonce will be
		considered stale and the UA will be re-challenged.
	</para>
	<para>
		<emphasis>Note:</emphasis> <varname>nonce_count</varname> should be 
		enabled only in stateful mode (a transaction should be created prior
		to the authentication check to absorb possible retransmissions and all
		the replies should be sent statefuly, using 
		<function>t_reply()</function>).
		If <varname>nonce_count</varname> and the authentication checks are
		used in the stateless mode then all retransmissions will be 
		challenged.
	</para>
	<para>
		The default value is 0 (off).
	</para>
	<para>
		See also: 
			<varname>qop</varname>,
			<varname>nc_array_size</varname>,
			<varname>nc_array_order</varname>,
			<varname>nid_pool_no</varname>,
			<varname>nonce_expire</varname>.
			<varname>one_time_nonce</varname>.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>nonce_count example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "nonce_count", 1) # enable nonce_count support
modparam("auth", "qop", "auth")    # enable qop=auth

....
route{
...
	# go stateful and catch retransmissions
	if (!t_newtran()) {
	    xlog("L_NOTICE", "Failed to create new transaction\n");
 	    drop;
	};
	if (method=="REGISTER"){
		if (!www_authenticate("test", "credentials")){
			# reply must be sent with t_reply because the 
			# transaction is already created at this point 
			# (we are in "stateful" mode)
			if ($? == -2){
				t_reply("500", "Internal Server Error");
			}else if ($? == -3){
				t_reply("400", "Bad Request");
			}else{
				if ($digest_challenge) 
					append_to_reply("%$digest_challenge");
				t_reply("401", "Unauthorized");
			}
			drop;
		}
		if (!save_noreply("location")) {
			t_reply("400", "Invalid REGISTER Request");
			drop;
		}
		append_to_reply("%$contact");
		t_reply("$code", "$reason"); # no %, avps are used directly 
		drop;
	}else{
		if (!proxy_authenticate("my_realm", "credentials")){
			if ($? == -2){
				t_reply("500", "Internal Server Error");
			}else if ($? == -3){
				t_reply("400", "Bad Request");
			}else{
				if ($digest_challenge) 
					append_to_reply("%$digest_challenge");
				t_reply("401", "Unauthorized");
			}
			drop;
		}
	}
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
    </section>

	<section id="auth.p.one_time_nonce">
	<title><varname>one_time_nonce</varname> (boolean)</title>
	<para>
		If set to 1 nonce reuse is disabled: each nonce is allowed only once,
		in the first reponse to a challenge. All the messages will be 
		challenged, even retransmissions. Stateful mode should be used, to
		catch retransmissions before the authentication checks (using
		<function>t_newtran()</function> before the authentication checks
		and sending all the replies with <function>t_reply()</function>).
	</para>
	<para>
		<varname>one_time_nonce</varname> provides enhanced replay protections
		at the cost of invalidating UA side credentials caching, challenging
		every message (and thus generating extra messages and extra 
		round-trips) and requiring stateful mode. In general 
		<varname>qop</varname> and <varname>nonce_count</varname> should
		be prefered (if possible) with fallback to 
		<varname>auth_checks_*</varname>. Due to the disadvantages listed 
		above, <varname>one_time_nonce</varname> should be used only if the 
		extra checks provided by <varname>auth_checks_register</varname>,
		<varname>auth_checks_no_dlg</varname> and
		<varname>auth_checks_in_dlg</varname> are deemed insufficient for a
		specific setup.
	</para>
	<para>
		Compared to <varname>nonce_count</varname>, 
		<varname>one_time_nonce</varname> provides the same protection, but at
		a higher message cost. The only advantages are that it works with
		user agents that do not support <emphasis>qop</emphasis> and 
		<emphasis>nc</emphasis> and that it uses less memory for the same
		supported number of maximum in-flight nonces (by a factor of 8).
		<varname>one_time_nonce</varname> can be used as fallback from
		<varname>nonce_count</varname>, when the UA doesn't support 
		<emphasis>nc</emphasis> (it happens automatically when both of them
		are enabled).
	</para>
	<para>
		Like <varname>nonce_count</varname>, <varname>one_time_nonce</varname>
		works by tracking a limited number of nonces. The maximum number of 
		tracked nonces is set using the <varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname> or
		<varname>otn_in_flight_order</varname> parameters. If this number is 
		exceeded, older entries will be overwritten. As long as the maximum
		rate of challengeable messages per average response time is lower then
		<varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname>, the 
		<varname>one_time_nonce</varname> checks should work flawlessly.
	</para>
	<para>
		The default value is 0 (off).
	</para>
	<para>
		See also:
			<varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname>,
			<varname>otn_in_flight_order</varname>,
			<varname>nid_pool_no</varname> and
			<varname>nonce_count</varname>.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>one_time_nonce example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "one_time_nonce", 1)
# Note: stateful mode should be used, see the nonce_count example
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
	</section>

    <section id="auth.p.nid_pool_no">
	<title><varname>nid_pool_no</varname> (integer)</title>
	<para>
		Controls the number of partitions for the 
		<varname>nonce_count</varname> and <varname>one_time_nonce</varname>
		arrays (it's common to both of them to reduce the nonce size).
	</para>
	<para>
		Instead of using single arrays for keeping nonce state, these arrays
		can be divided into more partitions. Each ser process is assigned to
		one of these partitions, allowing for higher concurrency on multi-CPU
		machines. Besides increasing performance, increasing 
		<varname>nid_pool_no</varname> has also a negative effect: it could
		decrease the maximum supported in-flight nonces in certain conditions.
		In the worst case, when only one ser process receives most of the 
		traffic (e.g. very busy tcp connection between two proxies), the 
		in-flight nonces could be limited to the array size 
		(<varname>nc_array_size</varname> for <varname>nonce_count</varname>
		 or <varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname> for 
		 <varname>one_time_nonce</varname>) divided by the partitions number
		 (<varname>nid_pool_no</varname>). However for normal traffic, when
		 the process receiving a message is either random or chosen in 
		 a round-robin fashion the maximum in-flight nonces number will be 
		 very little influenced by <varname>nid_pool_no</varname> (the 
		 messages will be close to equally distributed to processes using
		 different partitions).
	</para>
	<para>
		<varname>nid_pool_no</varname> value should be one of: 1, 2, 4, 8, 16,
		32 or 64 (the maximum value is 64 and all values should be of the 
		form 2^k or else they will be rounded down to 2^k).
	</para>
	<para>
	    The default value is 1.
	</para>
	<para>
		See also:
			<varname>nonce_count</varname>,
			<varname>one_time_nonce</varname>,
			<varname>nc_array_size</varname> and
			<varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname>.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>nid_pool_no example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "nid_pool_no", 4)
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
    </section>

    <section id="auth.p.nc_array_size">
	<title><varname>nc_array_size</varname> (integer)</title>
	<para>
		Maximum number of in-flight nonces for <varname>nonce_count</varname>.
		It represents the maximum nonces for which state will be kept. When
		this number is exceeded, state for the older nonces will be 
		discarded to make space for new ones (see 
		<varname>nonce_count</varname> for more details).
	</para>
	<para>
		The value should be of the form 2^k. If it's not it will be rounded
		down to 2^k (for example a value of 1000000 will be rounded down to
		2^19=524288). <varname>nc_array_order</varname> can be used to 
		directly specify the power of 2 (e.g. 
		<varname>nc_array_order</varname> set to 20 is equivalent to
		<varname>nc_array_size</varname> set to 1048576).
	</para>
	<para>
		The memory used to keep the nonce state will be 
		<varname>nc_array_size</varname> in bytes.
	</para>
	<para>
	    The default value is 1048576 (1M in-flight nonces, using 1Mb memory).
	</para>
	<para>
		See also:
			<varname>nonce_count</varname> and
			<varname>nid_pool_no</varname>.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>nc_array_size example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "nc_array_size", 4194304)   # 4Mb
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
    </section>

    <section id="auth.p.nc_array_order">
	<title><varname>nc_array_order</varname> (integer)</title>
	<para>
		Equivalent to <varname>nc_array_size</varname>, but instead of 
		directly specifying the size, its value is the power at which 2 should
		be raised (log2(<varname>nc_array_size</varname>)).
	</para>
	<para>
		<varname>nc_array_size</varname> = 2^<varname>nc_array_order</varname>.
		For more details see <varname>nc_array_size</varname>.
	</para>
	<para>
	    The default value is 20 (1M in-flight nonces, using 1Mb memory).
	</para>
	<para>
		See also:
			<varname>nonce_count</varname>,
			<varname>nc_array_size</varname> and
			<varname>nid_pool_no</varname>.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>nc_array_order example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "nc_array_order", 22)   # 4Mb
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
    </section>

    <section id="auth.p.otn_in_flight_no">
	<title><varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname> (integer)</title>
	<para>
		Maximum number of in-flight nonces for 
		<varname>one_time_nonce</varname>. It represents the maximum number
		of nonces remembered for the one-time-nonce check. When this 
		number is exceeded, information about older nonces will be discarded
		and overwritten with information about the new generated ones (see
		<varname>one_time_nonce</varname> for more details).
	</para>
	<para>
		The value should be of the form 2^k. If it's not it will be rounded
		down to 2^k (for example a value of 1000000 will be rounded down to
		2^19=524288). <varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname> can be used to 
		directly specify the power of 2 (e.g. 
		<varname>otn_in_flight_order</varname> set to 19 is equivalent to
		<varname>otn_in_fligh_number</varname> set to 524288).
	</para>
	<para>
		The memory used to keep the nonce information will be the
		<varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname> divided by 8 (only 1 bit of state
		is kept per nonce).
	</para>
	<para>
		The default value is 1048576 (1M in-flight nonces, using 
		128Kb memory).
	</para>
	<para>
		See also:
			<varname>one_time_nonce</varname> and
			<varname>nid_pool_no</varname>.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>otn_in_flight_no example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "otn_in_flight_no", 8388608)   # 8 Mb (1Mb memory)
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
    </section>

    <section id="auth.p.otn_in_flight_order">
	<title><varname>otn_in_flight_order</varname> (integer)</title>
	<para>
		Equivalent to <varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname>, but instead of
		directly specifying the size, its value is the power at which 2 should
		be raised (log2(<varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname>)).
	</para>
	<para>
		<varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname> = 
		2^<varname>otn_in_flight_order</varname>.
		For more details see <varname>otn_in_flight_order</varname>.
	</para>
	<para>
		The default value is 20 (1M in-flight nonces, using 128Kb memory).
	</para>
	<para>
		See also:
			<varname>one_time_nonce</varname>,
			<varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname> and
			<varname>nid_pool_no</varname>.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>otn_in_flight_order example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "otn_in_flight_order", 23)   # 8 Mb (1Mb memory)
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
    </section>

    <section id="auth.p.secret">
	<title><varname>secret</varname> (string)</title>
	<para>Secret phrase used to calculate the nonce value used to challenge
	the client for authentication.</para>
	<para>If you use multiple servers in your installation, and would like to
	authenticate on the second server against the nonce generated at the
	first one its necessary to explicitly set the secret to the same value
	on all servers. However, as the use of a shared (and fixed) secret as
	nonce is insecure, it is much better is to stay with the default. Any
	clients should send the authenticated request to the server that 
	issued the challenge.
	</para>
	<para>
	    Default value is randomly generated string.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>Setting secret module parameter</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "secret", "johndoessecretphrase")
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
    </section>

    <section id="auth.p.nonce_expire">
	<title><varname>nonce_expire</varname> (integer)</title>
	<para>
	    Nonces have limited lifetime. After a given period of time nonces
	    will be considered invalid. This is to protect replay
	    attacks. Credentials containing a stale nonce will be not
	    authorized, but the user agent will be challenged again. This time
	    the challenge will contain <varname>stale</varname> parameter which
	    will indicate to the client that it doesn't have to disturb user by
	    asking for username and password, it can recalculate credentials
	    using existing username and password.
	</para>
	<para>
	    The value is in seconds and default value is 300 seconds.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>nonce_expire example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "nonce_expire", 600)   # Set nonce_expire to 600s
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
    </section>

	<section id="auth.p.nonce_auth_max_drift">
	<title><varname>nonce_auth_max_drift</varname> (integer)</title>
	<para>
		Maximum difference in seconds between a nonce creation time and the
		current time, if the nonce creation time appears to be in the future.
	</para>
	<para>
		In some cases, like shortly after a system time backward adjustment 
		or when the current proxy is part of a cluster which is not
		time-synchronized, it's possible to receive a nonce with creation time
		in the future. In this case if the difference is greater then
		<varname>nonce_auth_max_drift</varname> seconds, consider the nonce
		stale and re-challenge (otherwise after a dramatic time change
		backwards, it might happen that some previously generated nonces will
		be valid for too much time).
	</para>
	<para>
		The default value is 3 seconds
	</para>
	<para>
		See also: <varname>nonce_expire</varname>.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>nonce_auth_max_drift example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "nonce_auth_max_drift", 1)   # set max drift to 1 s
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
    </section>

	<section id="auth.p.force_stateless_reply">
	<title><varname>force_stateless_reply</varname> (boolean)</title>
	<para>
		If set to 1, <function>www_challenge()</function> and
		<function>proxy_challenge()</function>
		functions send reply statelessly no matter if transaction
                exists or not.  If set to 0 (default), reply is sent statefully
		if transaction exists and statelessly otherwise.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>force_stateless_reply example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "force_stateless_reply", 1)
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
	</section>

	<section id="auth.p.realm_prefix">
		<title><varname>realm_prefix</varname> (string)</title>
		<para>
			Prefix to be automatically stripped from the realm. As an alternative to
			SRV records (not all SIP clients support SRV lookup), a subdomain
			of the master domain can be defined for SIP purposes (like 
			sip.mydomain.net pointing to same IP address as the SRV
			record for mydomain.net). By ignoring the realm_prefix 
			<quote>sip.</quote>, at authentication, sip.example.com will be
			equivalent to example.com .
		</para>
		<para>
		Default value is empty string.
		</para>
		<example>
		<title>realm_prefix parameter example</title>
		<programlisting format="linespecific">
modparam("auth", "realm_prefix", "sip.")
</programlisting>
		</example>
	</section>

	<section id="auth.p.use_domain">
	<title><varname>use_domain</varname> (boolean)</title>
	<para>
		If set to 1, <function>pv_auth_check()</function> uses
		domain parts of the URIs to check user identity.
	</para>
	<example>
	    <title>force_stateless_reply example</title>
	    <programlisting>
...
modparam("auth", "use_domain", 1)
...
	    </programlisting>
	</example>
	</section>

</section>
