AST-2014-001: Stack overflow in HTTP processing of Cookie headers.

Sending a HTTP request that is handled by Asterisk with a large number of
Cookie headers could overflow the stack.

Another vulnerability along similar lines is any HTTP request with a
ridiculous number of headers in the request could exhaust system memory.

(closes issue ASTERISK-23340)
Reported by: Lucas Molas, researcher at Programa STIC, Fundacion; and Dr. Manuel Sadosky, Buenos Aires, Argentina


git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/branches/1.8@410380 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3
changes/98/198/1
Richard Mudgett 12 years ago
parent b0df15e1bf
commit 1d8a661b30

@ -187,9 +187,7 @@ uint32_t ast_http_manid_from_vars(struct ast_variable *headers)
break;
}
}
if (cookies) {
ast_variables_destroy(cookies);
}
ast_variables_destroy(cookies);
return mngid;
}
@ -824,12 +822,13 @@ static int ssl_close(void *cookie)
}*/
#endif /* DO_SSL */
static struct ast_variable *parse_cookies(char *cookies)
static struct ast_variable *parse_cookies(const char *cookies)
{
char *parse = ast_strdupa(cookies);
char *cur;
struct ast_variable *vars = NULL, *var;
while ((cur = strsep(&cookies, ";"))) {
while ((cur = strsep(&parse, ";"))) {
char *name, *val;
name = val = cur;
@ -859,21 +858,19 @@ static struct ast_variable *parse_cookies(char *cookies)
/* get cookie from Request headers */
struct ast_variable *ast_http_get_cookies(struct ast_variable *headers)
{
struct ast_variable *v, *cookies=NULL;
struct ast_variable *v, *cookies = NULL;
for (v = headers; v; v = v->next) {
if (!strcasecmp(v->name, "Cookie")) {
char *tmp = ast_strdupa(v->value);
if (cookies) {
ast_variables_destroy(cookies);
}
cookies = parse_cookies(tmp);
ast_variables_destroy(cookies);
cookies = parse_cookies(v->value);
}
}
return cookies;
}
/*! Limit the number of request headers in case the sender is being ridiculous. */
#define MAX_HTTP_REQUEST_HEADERS 100
static void *httpd_helper_thread(void *data)
{
@ -884,6 +881,7 @@ static void *httpd_helper_thread(void *data)
struct ast_variable *tail = headers;
char *uri, *method;
enum ast_http_method http_method = AST_HTTP_UNKNOWN;
int remaining_headers;
if (ast_atomic_fetchadd_int(&session_count, +1) >= session_limit) {
goto done;
@ -918,9 +916,13 @@ static void *httpd_helper_thread(void *data)
if (*c) {
*c = '\0';
}
} else {
ast_http_error(ser, 400, "Bad Request", "Invalid Request");
goto done;
}
/* process "Request Headers" lines */
remaining_headers = MAX_HTTP_REQUEST_HEADERS;
while (fgets(header_line, sizeof(header_line), ser->f)) {
char *name, *value;
@ -943,6 +945,11 @@ static void *httpd_helper_thread(void *data)
ast_trim_blanks(name);
if (!remaining_headers--) {
/* Too many headers. */
ast_http_error(ser, 413, "Request Entity Too Large", "Too many headers");
goto done;
}
if (!headers) {
headers = ast_variable_new(name, value, __FILE__);
tail = headers;
@ -950,11 +957,17 @@ static void *httpd_helper_thread(void *data)
tail->next = ast_variable_new(name, value, __FILE__);
tail = tail->next;
}
}
if (!*uri) {
ast_http_error(ser, 400, "Bad Request", "Invalid Request");
goto done;
if (!tail) {
/*
* Variable allocation failure.
* Try to make some room.
*/
ast_variables_destroy(headers);
headers = NULL;
ast_http_error(ser, 500, "Server Error", "Out of memory");
goto done;
}
}
handle_uri(ser, uri, http_method, headers);
@ -963,9 +976,7 @@ done:
ast_atomic_fetchadd_int(&session_count, -1);
/* clean up all the header information */
if (headers) {
ast_variables_destroy(headers);
}
ast_variables_destroy(headers);
if (ser->f) {
fclose(ser->f);

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